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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
v. : 
CHARLES ROBERT OTT, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
Case No. 870225-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDEAT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction for the offense of 
theft, a third degree felony, after a tri[al in the Fourth 
District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1986). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether defendant waived the issue regarding the 
admissibility of the receipt by his failure to object. 
2. Whether the trial court properly found that 
defendant did not establish the defense of compulsion. 
3. Whether the trial court correctly found the market 
value of the stolen goods to exceed two hundred and fifty 
dollars. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Charles Robert Ott, was charged with theft, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. $ 76-6-404 
(1978). Defendant was convicted of the charge on April 15, 1987, 
after a bench trial in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and 
for Millard County, State of Utah, the Honorable George E. 
Balliff Judge, presiding* Defendant was sentenced to serve a 
term of not more than five years in the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In February 1987, defendant, Charles Robert Ott, was 
approached by Darin Brailsford and asked if he would participate 
in stealing copper wire from the Intermountain Power Project near 
Delta, Utah (T. 31-33).* Brailsford promised defendant that he 
would pay defendant $100 for his efforts in the crime (T. 47, 
60). He also told defendant that Garth Bott had threatened him 
with serious injury or property damage if he did not pay Bott 
$900.00 for some copper wire which he had previously stolen and 
which Bott claimed was his stolen booty (T. 41, 43-45, 55, 60). 
On the night of February 11, 1987, defendant, Darin 
Brailsford, Jeff Ivie, and Charlie Case went to the Power Project 
in two separate trucks to steal copper wire (T. 33, 48). Parking 
their trucks just outside the Project fence, they climbed the 
fence, threw the scrap copper wire over the fence, and loaded a 
thousand pounds in each truck (R. 34-35, 49). In a nearby 
canyon, they unloaded the trucks and poured gasoline on the wire 
to burn off the insulation (R. 35, 50). 
On the morning of the 12th, they re-loaded their trucks 
with the bare copper wire and drove to Salt Lake City where 
Brailsford sold the copper to Wasatch Metal for $844.00 (T. 36, 
51). According to Brailsford, he gave $100.00 to defendant, 
$100.00 to Ivie, $100.00 to Case, and kept $100.00 for himself 
•T- refers to the Trial Transcript dated April 15, 1987. 
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(T. 36, 52) . Upon returning to Provo, Brailsford paid Bott the 
remaining $500*00 (T. 36, 52). 
On February 18, 1987, defendant and Brailsford returned 
to the Power Project to steal more copper wire (T. 38). 
According to Brailsford, Bott had made it known that he wanted 
the remaining $400.00 (T. 38, 54). This time, defendant and 
Brailsford were apprehended by security officers (T. 39). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMEN[T 
Defendant failed to object to the admission of the 
receipt on the grounds he now asserts on appeal, therefore, the 
issue is waived. In any event, the receipt would have been 
properly admitted as evidence under the inevitable discovery 
exception to the exclusionary rule in light of the testimony and 
statements of Jeff Ivie and Darin Brailsford. Even assuming 
admission of the receipt was error, it was harmless error since 
the relevant evidence contained in the receipt was also admitted 
through the testimony of Darin Brailsford and Von Holtman. 
The evidence at trial did not support the defense of 
compulsion since the threat was not imminent, defendant failed to 
report the threat to the authorities, defendant accepted 
compensation for his participation in the criminal acts, and 
defendant had lawful alternatives available to avoid the threat. 
The prosecution sufficiently established, through 
direct and circumstantial evidence, that the market value of the 
stolen copper exceeded the $250*00 necessary for third degree 
felony theft. 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO TIMELY OBJECT TO THE 
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE RECEIPT AND THUS WAIVED 
THE ISSUE FOR APPEAL. 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress 
the confession of defendant on the grounds that the confession 
was obtained by a promise of no prosecution (R. 19-20). At the 
pre-trial hearing on April lf 1987, defendant requested that the 
motion to suppress be combined with the trial since defendant had 
waived a jury trial (pp.2-3 of the Transcript of Hearing dated 
April 1, 1987). At trial, the State called Mr. Von Holtman, 
vice-president of Wasatch Metal and Salvage, who testified as an 
expert regarding the market value of scrap copper (T. 19-29). 
Mr. Holtman identified State's Exhibit No. 1 as a copy of a 
receipt for the purchase of 2,111 pounds of scrap copper from 
Darin Brailsford on February 12, 1987 (T. 22-23). Defendant did 
not object to the admission of the exhibit on the grounds that it 
was "fruit" of an illegal confession, but rather, he merely 
objected to the materiality of the exhibit (T. 24). The court 
received the exhibit subject to its materiality being established 
at a later time. Id. 
At no time did the State offer or refer to defendant's 
confession. However, the defendant himself testified that he 
gave a full confession of the crime including the fact that the 
Stolen copper was sold to Wasatch Metal and Salvage (T. 78). 
On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred 
in admitting the receipt since it was tainted evidence obtained 
from an inadmissible confession. Defendant's claim is without 
merit. 
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It is well established that a defendant waives any 
issue regarding the admissibility of evidence if he fails to 
state a timely and specific objection. See Utah R. Evid. 
103(a)(1); State v. Mitchell, 671 P.2d 213, 214 (Utah 1983); 
State v. Davis. 689 P.2d 5 (Utah 1984). In the instant case, 
defendant objected only to the materiality of the receipt since 
it had a date and value different than alleged in the information 
(T. 24-25). As a result of defendant's f&ilure, the trial court 
did not have an opportunity to timely rule on the issue defendant 
now asserts. 
Admittedly, defendant made a belated attempt to 
suppress the receipt at the close of the evidence (T. 86). 
However, as noted above, an objection to the admission of 
evidence must be timely. Accordingly, this Court should not 
consider defendant's claim of error. 
In the event that this Court reaches the merits of 
defendant's claim, and assuming the confession was inadmissible,2 
the receipt was admissible since its discovery was inevitable. 
The United States Supreme Court in the landmark case of Wong Sun, 
et al. v. United States. 371 U.S. 471 (1963) set forth the "fruit 
of the poisonous tree" doctrine which, in general, excludes 
evidence discovered as a result of illegal police action. 
However, the Court in Wong Sun acknowledged that there may be 
* The record contains no evidence regarding the content of the 
confession nor its admissibility. 
_c_ 
exceptions to the general rule of exclusion and noted as follows: 
We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit 
of the poisonous tree" simply because it 
would not have come to light but for the 
illegal actions of the police. Rather, the 
more apt question in such a case is "whether, 
granting establishment of the primary 
illegality, the evidence to which instant 
objection is made has been come at by 
exploitation of that illegality or instead by 
means sufficiently distinguishable to be 
purged of the primary taint." • . . 
371 U.S. at 487-88. 
Three distinct exceptions to the "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" doctrine have developed. Evidence will not be 
considered illegal "fruit" when: 
(1) the evidence was discovered by an 
independant source; (2) the evidence is 
sufficiently distant in casual connection 
from the illegal search and seizure so that 
the connection has become so attenuated as to 
dissipate the taint; or (3) the evidence 
inevitably would have been gained even 
without the unlawful search. 
United States, ex. rel Owens v. Twomey. 508 F.2d 858, 865 (7th 
Cir. 1974). While Twomey specifically refers to search and 
seizure, Wong Sun has broader application to all illegally 
obtained evidence. 
Regarding the third exception, the so called 
•inevitable discovery" doctrine, the United States Supreme Court 
explains: 
If the prosecution can establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the 
information ultimately or inevitably would 
have been discovered by lawful means . . . 
then the deterrence rationale has so little 
basis that the evidence should be received. • . . 
Njx V, Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984), gert- denied, 471 U.S. 
1138 (1985) (footnote omitted). 
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In the present case, two of defendant's accomplices, 
Brailsford and Ivie, pled guilty to reduced charges in exchange 
for their cooperation and testimony (T. 32, 67). Their testimony 
and confessions established that about 2,000 pounds of stolen 
copper wire was sold to Wasatch Metal and Salvage for $844.00 (T. 
36, 49, 65). Clearly, discovery of the receipt was inevitable in 
light of the accomplice's testimony and confessions. Therefore, 
the trial court did not err in admitting the receipt. 
Even assuming the admission of the receipt was error, 
it was harmless error. Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides that "[aJny error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party 
shall be disregarded.- Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-30(a) (1982). The 
Utah Supreme has interpreted this Rule to provide: 
that the error is reversible only if a review 
of the record persuades the court that 
without the error there was "a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
defendant." • . . 
Stat? V, Fpntana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984). 
In the present case, the receipt added nothing to the 
prosecution's evidence which had not already been established 
through witness testimony. The information from the receipt 
established; (1) the seller of the stolen copper, (2) the buyer 
of the stolen copper, (3) the date of the sale, (4) the quantity 
sold, (5) the price per pound, and (6) the total price paid (R. 
16) . 
In comparison, Brailsford testified that; (1) he was 
the seller, (2) Wasatch Metal and Salvage was the buyer, (3) the 
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date of the sale was February 12, 1987, (4) the quantity sold was 
about 2,000 pounds, and (5) the total price paid was $844.00 (T. 
36, 49, 51, 59). The price per pound is determinable by dividing 
the quantity sold into the total price. In addition, Mr. Holtman 
testified that the price per pound for insulated copper wire , 
similar to that stolen, would be approximately 30 cents per pound 
(T. 28). Thus, the admission of the receipt did not provide any 
information that was not already in evidence through witness 
testimony. 
Notably, defendant volunteered his testimony at trial 
that he had confessed to the crime (T. 77-78). By doing so, 
defendant effectively waived his motion to suppress and any 
issues arising therefrom. Under the above circumstances, it is 
highly improbable that the result would have been different in 
the absence of the admission of the receipt. Therefore, any 
error in the admission of the receipt should be deemed harmless. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT 
DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISH THE DEFENSE OF 
COMPULSION. 
At trial, defendant asserted that he was compelled to 
participate in the theft in order to prevent physical harm to his 
friend Darin Brailsford (T. 71-73). He testified that Brailsford 
had come to him and explained that Bott was going to kill 
Brailsford unless Brailsford paid Bott $900.00. M * The trial 
court rejected defendant's claim as follows: 
The Court rejects the defense of 
compulsion that has been contended. The 
Court does not believe that the defendant did 
this act for the predominating purpose of 
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trying to save a friend from vicious threats 
that had been made against him by another 
person as a result of thieving, as he put it, 
that was going on. 
The story that he tells is hard to 
believe. It does not appear to be the kind 
of relationship between him and Mr. 
Brailsford that would dictate a person 
putting himself in jeopardy of violence being 
so dramatically opposed to it by his 
expressions, just is not believable, and the 
evidence is overwhelming that he participated 
for criminal intents and purposes. The Court 
finds him guilty. 
(R. 90-91). 
On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred 
in rejecting defendant's claim of compulsion. The defense of 
compulsion is set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302(1) (1978) 
which provides: 
A person is not guilty of an offense when he 
engaged in to proscribed conduct because he 
was coerced to do so by the use or threatened 
imminent use of unlawful physical force upon 
him or a third person, which force or 
threatened force a person of reasonable 
firmness in his situation would not have 
resisted. 
In order to establish the defense of compulsion, three elements 
must be proved: 1) the defendant must be faced with an imminent 
threat of death or substantial bodily injury, 2) the threat of 
substantial bodily injury must be specific, and 3) there must be 
no time for complaint to the authorities. State v. Tuttle* 730 
P.2d 630 (Utah 1986). Defendant's claim must fail for several 
reasons. 
First, the threat of bodily injury to Mr. Brailsford 
was not imminent. See United States v. Campbell, 675 F.2d 815 
(6th Cir. 1982). According to defendant, Brailsford had "three 
days to come up with the money" (T. 83). Clearly, there was 
sufficient time to avoid the threat of harm by pursuing lawful 
alternatives. 
Second, defendant had the opportunity to report the 
threat to the authorities but failed to do so. While defendant 
claimed that he did make an anonymous inquiry to the police, he 
testified that he did not report the details of the threat for 
fear of implicating Brailsford in the copper thefts (T. 72, 83). 
Defendant's desire to conceal Brailsford's independent criminal 
acts cannot justify his failure to report the alleged coercive 
threats, and subsequently, the commission of further criminal 
acts. £e£ State v. Patterson, 241 P 977 (Or. 1925). 
Third, defendant admitted that he was offered and later 
received $100.00 for his participation in the theft (T. 79). He 
accepted the $100.00 despite the fact that Brailsford needed to 
pay Bott an additional $400.00 to avoid the threatened harm (T. 
36-38, 79-80). Certainly, if defendant's purpose for 
participating in the thefts was to avoid harm to Brailsford, 
defendant would not have accepted any profits from the criminal 
acts until Brailsford had paid Bott in full. Seq People v. 
Tallent, 200 P.2d 214 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948). 
Finally, the substance of the threat did not require 
the commission of a separate criminal act in order to avoid the 
harm. The alleged threat was intended to compel Brailsford to 
pay money to Bott, not to commit a criminal act. Lawful 
alternatives were available to Brailsford and defendant which 
would have effectively avoided the harm. For example, defendant 
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could have helped his friend by raising funds through lawful 
wages, a loan, or selling lawfully possessed property such as a 
truck. The evidence is clear that Brailsford was not being 
coerced to commit a crime, but simply to pay a debt, gee Smith 
V. State, 703 P.2d 201 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985). 
In light of the compelling evidence, this Court should 
find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding 
that the evidence did not support the defense of compulsion. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE 
VALUE OF THE STOLEN PROPERTY EXCEEDED THE 
$250.00 NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THIRD DEGREE 
FELONY THEFT. 
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish the property value element of third degree felony 
theft. Theft is classified as a felony of the third degree if: 
"The value of the property or services i& more than $250.00 but 
not more than $1000.00." Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-412(1)(b)(i) 
(1978). The Utah Supreme Court established the standard for 
determining the value of stolen goods in State v. Carter, 707 
P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985) which reads as follows: 
Where stolen property is not destroyed but 
is recovered, it is valued at its fair market 
value at the time and place where the alleged 
crime was committed. • . • 
Id, The Utah Supreme Court has further defined fair market value 
ass 
a measure of what the owner could expect to 
receive, and the amount a willing buyer would 
pay to the true owner for the stolen item. . . • 
State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 813 (Utah 1977) (footnotes 
omitted). 
-11-
Defendant claims three things added to the value of the 
property: 1) burning off the insulation, 2) labor in burning and 
loading the wire, and 3) transporting the wire to Salt Lake City. 
Regarding defendant's claim, the trial court found as follows: 
THE COURT: Let's see. If we had the labor 
at the minimum wage, what is the 
minimum wage? 
MR. HARMON: 
THE COURT: 
THE COURT: 
MR. HARMON 
THE COURT: 
It's at three twenty-five an 
hour • 
You said it took about six hours 
to rend the copper down to 
eliminate the covering? 
MR. HARMON: Yes. 
So that's about 24 hours all 
totalled. That's the only value 
added, as I see it, if there's 
any merit to your argument. And 
if you take maybe a couple of 
hundred dollars off of that, 
you're still in the felony 
range. 
But we have the value that it 
took to load the copper, your 
honor. 
Well, I don't think that would 
have anything to do with any 
value added, because it has not 
changed the character of it. 
The burning of the insulation 
changed the character of it. If 
anything made it more valuable 
after it left the yard, it was 
burning off the coating, not 
necessarily the transportation. 
Only that act of burning off the 
insulation. 
And, frankly, I don't buy your 
question of value added. I 
think, even at the best, it 
would not bring it down below a 
value of $500.00. 
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THE COURT: Well, in this matter the Court 
finds that evidence has been 
presented sufficient on the 
value to establish that a Third 
Degree Felony has been 
committed. That the evidence is 
overwhelming that Mr. Ott went 
there, that he participated in 
the entire process of taking and 
transporting and rendering the 
covering off of the wire and 
taking it to Salt Lake City and 
selling it, and participating in 
the proceeds. 
On appeal, this Court's inquiry should focus on whether 
there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's 
finding that the stolen property exceeded $250.00 in value. In 
State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246, 247 (1970), the 
Court held that in determining whether the evidence justifies the 
verdict, the Supreme Court certifies the evidence and any 
reasonable inferences that fairly may be drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the jury's verdict. The Court further 
explained that: 
Unless upon our review of the evidence, and 
the reasonable inferences fairly to be 
deduced therefrom, it appears that there is 
no reasonable basis therein for such a 
conclusion, we should not overturn the 
verdict. 
470 P.2d at 247 (footnote omitted). (Emphasis added.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently given great 
deference to the rulings of trial courts and the verdicts of 
juries. In the case of State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 
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1976), the Court stated: 
This Court has long upheld the standard 
that on an appeal from conviction the court 
cannot weigh the evidence nor say what 
quantum is necessary to establish a fact 
beyond a reasonable doubt so long as the 
evidence given is substantial. Further, this 
court has maintained that its function is not 
to determine guilt or innocence, the weight 
to give conflicting evidence, credibility of 
witnesses, or the weight to be given the 
defendant's testimony. . . . 
554 P.2d at 218 (footnote omitted). 
The Court has further held that, depending on the case, 
circumstantial evidence may surpass direct evidence in its effect 
on the jury. State v. Housekeeper. 588 P.2d 139 (Utah 1978). In 
State v. Kazda, 15 Utah 2d 313, 392 P.2d 486 (1964), the Court 
held that a jury can find not only facts shown directly by the 
evidence, but also such additional facts as may be inferred 
therefrom. The same reasoning applies to the findings of a trial 
court. 
In the present case, the prosecution established that 
the stolen copper was sold in Salt Lake City for $844.00 after 
being stripped of its insulation (T. 36). Additionally, Mr. 
Holtman testified as an expert that copper wire of the quality 
stolen would sell in Salt Lake City for about 30 cents per pound 
with the insulation intact (T. 28, 30). At that price, the 
stolen insulated copper wire would have been worth $633.30 in 
Salt Lake City. 
Admittedly, there was no direct testimony regarding the 
fair market value of the copper wire at the project site. 
However, the testimony established that by transporting the 
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copper wire 100 miles north to Salt Lake City, it was worth 
$633.30 with the insulation intact (T. 68-69). Based upon this 
evidence, the trial court inferred that in any event, the 
insulated copper wire did not have a value of less than $500.00 
(T* 69, 90). Such an inference is reasonable for two reasons: 
1) the market for metal salvage was in Salt Lake, not the project 
site, and 2) the cost of transporting the stolen property from 
the project site to Salt Lake via two pickup trucks could not 
reasonably have exceeded the difference between $633.00 and 
$250.00. Therefore, this Court should find that there was 
sufficient evidence, including reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, to reasonably find that the value of the stolen 
property exceeded the $250.00 element of Third Degree Theft. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
affirm defendants conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ T day of April, 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Milton T. Harmon, attorney for defendant, 36 South Main 
Street, Nephi, Utah 84648, this day of April, 1988. 
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